The Origins of Environment Sustainability in the German Chemical Industry, 1950s-1980s 1 This working paper explores the evolution of environmental strategies in the German chemical industry between the 1950s and the 1980s. Historical research on corporate environmental policies remains skewed. A vibrant environmental history literature has often identified business as a primary agent in environmental degradation, but it has usually not delved deeper into corporate strategies. The business history literature has only recently engaged with the topic of business and the environment, 2 And the history of corporate responsibility more generally. 3 This may reflect a disciplinary bias towards exploring issues related to innovation and growth, or else the failure to achieve them, rather than addressing negative outcomes of such innovation and growth.
It is well-established that the emergence of concerns that industrialization and modernization were damaging the natural environment date back to the nineteenth century. 4 These concerns were driven by early ecologists, philosophers and scientists rather than business leaders, although by the late nineteenth century industrial pollution in major US cities such as Chicago and St. Louis was so evident that it encouraged a handful of business leaders to organize to persuade the business community to voluntarily seek ways to control such pollution. 5 During the era of German industrialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, conservationists also lamented the dangerous impact of chemical effluents on water and air. 6 However after 1914 the era of world wars, virulent nationalism, and economic crisis did not provide a favourable context for the continued growth of environmental consciousness. 7 Environmentalism became, if anything, associated with rightwing political extremism. Historians were distressed the discover that the Nazi regime introduced pioneering environmental legislation in Germany during the 1930s, although given the other policies of the criminal regime claims that the Nazi's were "proto-Greens" are clearly wholly misplaced.
After the end of World War 2, attention was more focused on economic recovery, but the renewal of a more widely based environmental movement was propelled by a growing number of accidents and pollution incidents. There was a new articulation of environmental threats. Rachel Carson's Silent Spring had a much-observed impact in raising awareness of the detrimental environmental impact of pesticides. 8 In 1972 the United Nations held the first Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, which was followed by a new environmental legislation in Europe. 9 Rising environmental concerns, and the legislation which it stimulated, had substantial consequences for businesses, and especially for those who were directly associated with activities deemed polluting. In post-war France, Boullet has described the emergence of environmental strategies in heavy industries, including chemicals, in response to regulation, ecological disasters and shifting public opinion. 10 The literature on the United States is larger.
Hoffman, in a study of the chemical and petroleum industries, identified an evolution of corporate strategies over time. During the 1960s many US corporations believed that environmental concerns were exaggerated, and if there were problems, that they could handle them. In the wake of the 1970 Environmental Protection Act, there was a somewhat sullen commitment to technical compliance with the law. During the 1980s, as environmental activism rose, US firms began to engage more proactively in establishing environmental rules. 11 Hoffman's study forms part of a wider literature on the history of environmental management and strategy in the post-war chemical industry, including studies by Colten and Skinner, Markowitz and Rosner, and Ross and Amter. 12 For the most part, these studies are critical of the industry's claims to be following best practices during the post-war decades, and frequently criticise a gap between the public statements of firms and what they actually knew about pollution. On a similar line, there are studies by Kehoe and by McGucken, concerning the pollution caused by the discharge of detergents into lakes and rivers, although these authors also note the scientific uncertainties faced by policy makers and companies. 13 These studies have limited firm-level analysis. One exception is Smith's survey of the environmental policies of DuPont, which is more positive about the company's environmental strategies, and also stresses the uncertain toxicological knowledge on which decisions needed to be made. 14 In other industries and countries, firm-level studies have also pointed towards imperfect information as a constraint, as well as organizational deficiencies within the firms themselves. 15 This working paper takes a firm and industry level perspectives, and focuses on postwar Germany. The choice of country is deliberate. The German Federal Republic (hereafter West Germany) as a country has often been considered as a European pioneer in green policies. In 1979 the Green political party was founded in West Germany, and became the first European Green party to make a major political impact in 1983, when it won 28 seats in the Bundestag (the West German parliament). 16 German business has also been seen as a pioneer in addressing environmental issues.
A 1995 study asserted that German business had been a top spender ″for a cleaner environment… since the early 1970s.″ 17 However it is not clear how this happened, or whether it is really true, as there has been less historical research on green business strategies in West Germany compared to the United States. Most research has focused on the issue of industrial pollution primarily before 1945, and is heavily focussed on government policy. 18 While business has been identified as a major polluter, firm strategies have not been discussed in detail in recent studies of the evolution of environmental policy, including Uekötter's comparative study of German and American policies on air pollution before 1970. Uekötter mentions Bayer only once and Henkel not at all. 19 The theory of why some firms become "greener" than others is still being developed.
The international political economy literature has sought explanations in the varieties of capitalism model. Mikler, in a comparative study of the automobile industry, has argued that firms in coordinated market economies, such as Germany and Japan, are more inclined to adopt greener strategies than their counterparts in liberal market economies, such as the United States and Britain. It has been suggested that firms in such coordinated market economies operated with a framework of collaborative-consensus setting between business and government, that companies incorporated consumer attitudes rather than price signals in their strategies, and that soft topics counted more in internal corporate strategy. 20 In the organizational sociology literature, there is also an emergent body of theory seeking to understand why some firms selectively disclose information about their environmental impacts, more colloquially known as greenwashing. This literature builds on earlier work which has explored how an organization's visibility affects compliance with institutional pressures. There is evidence that greater visibility makes organizations more concerned with their legitimacy, although other research has suggested that the more powerful an organization the more it can afford to resist pressures from external stakeholders. 21 Marquis and Toffel have employed a large-scale comparative sample on corporate environmental disclosure to distinguish between "generic visibility," such as just being big and well-known, and "domain-specific visibility," such as being identified specifically with an issue like worker safety, which exposes it to special scrutiny and is more likely to prompt more transparent disclosure. 22 This working paper will examine the strategies of two prominent chemical companies, 
The Rise of Pollution as a Political Issue
In the wake of the devastation caused by World War 2, environmental issues were not at the forefront of either political or corporate agendas. Unlike in many American cities, where debates about air and water pollution were underway, German society was struggling with economic reconstruction, the rebuilding of bombed cities, the integration of millions of displaced people, and the ethical collapse of Nazism. The chemical industry was hailed as a pillar of reconstruction, and a champion of Germany's burgeoning export economy. Pollution was accepted as a necessary evil. 38 However, as the economy recovered, environmental problems, especially air and water pollution, emerged in public discourses. 39 Pollution was especially evident in the industrialized region of NRW. A report by independent experts in 1961 showed that there was heavy air and water pollution near the Henkel and Bayer factories. 40 Local residents complained about unpleasant black smoke, carbon black particles, and bad odours. Residents living near the main Henkel factory wrote to the company complaining about increases in carbon black output, gas smells, and soot. 41 During 1962 one resident repeatedly drove his car to the Henkel headquarters showing the black and white particles dirtying his Mercedes. 42 Residents near the Bayer factory at Leverkusen also complained. In 1958 Bayer had installed a giant illuminated version of its logo, the Bayer Cross, overlooking Leverkusen. It was the largest illuminated advertisement in the world, and might be considered a symbol of "domain-specific visibility." The problem was that it shone over a stinking city. Bayer received growing complaints about foul air, and especially the acidic effluents which stank, destroyed garden plants, caused headaches, and ruined women's nylons. Bayer paid compensation for the nylons, but officially maintained that they must have been of poor quality to be affected by the effluents. 43 In one official report initiated by the city of Düsseldorf covering the years 1958 to 1961, Bayer was directly accused of emitting too much ash and sulphur dioxides into the air, and requested to build taller chimneys with the idea that pushing the air high up in the atmosphere would help to thin out the pollution. 44 The NRW was no stranger to bad smells. The traditional corporate response to complaints was to stress the importance of the industry. During the early 1950s Henkel's managers regularly stated that odour nuisances could not be further reduced, and that the neighbours would just have to live with them. 45 A decade later Bayer's managers were still asserting in public that the discharged air was not harmful to humans, and that any nuisances should be accepted for the sake of employment and economic development. 46 The pollution just got worse. In the mid-1960s, a phenomena known as ″Auto-Pocken″ (″car-pox″) appeared near Bayer's factories. Effluents caused severe paint damage on 7,000 cars. Bayer paid almost one million D-Mark in compensation (approximately £89,600). 47 The mysterious damage, whose cause could not be determined with certainty, had a distinctly negative impact on Bayer's image in the neighbourhoods affected. 48 Factory effluents in water were also a source of major concern. Between 1949 and 1952 local authorities repeatedly warned Henkel not to release allegedly dangerous effluents into the public wastewater system. Bayer also faced an alarming number of dead fish close to its factory on the Rhine, which was attributed to a high level of Phenol released by Bayer. Code was finally modified to strengthen the rights of residents living around factories to sue for financial compensation. 53 However, it was difficult to prove cause, and local authorities left it to companies to determine the cause of pollution. in the context of a growing population and rising industrial production. Waste water was still perceived to be a major a problem, and a further State Water Act was passed in 1962. 56 Overall, these water management initiatives imposed few restrictions on industry, and were little more than devices to create structures for studying problems, much as was parallel legislation in the United States. 57 The exception was the detergent industry. There were no radical changes in either legislation or corporate policies after 1961.
However, there was a new willingness on the part of the NRW regional authorities to push back when Bayer, Henkel and the other companies sought to acquire licenses for new factories. In their applications, the companies employed the concept of Gewerbefreiheit (″freedom of occupation″) which included the freedom to practice any trade or craft and, closely connected to it, the freedom to take one's residence where one wished. Both Bayer and
Henkel pleaded for their autonomy on these grounds when it came to locational decisions. 62 Yet an increasingly concerned public informed by critical investigative journalists made their voices heard, and the willingness of local politicians to listen to them was discernible.
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Corporate Policies towards Pollution in the 1950s and 1960s
Henkel and Bayer managers were not born ″eco-pioneers.″ During the post-war decades corporate policies towards the environment evolved slowly, grudgingly, and in response to mounting complaints.
In 1958 Henkel responded to criticisms by founding a Water Pollution Control
Laboratory to monitor water pollution. It made incremental improvements to existing factories to curb effluent emissions, and helped design new factories with better water pollution controls. 64 The more substantive investment came in detergents. had also developed a plan for air pollution control, which utilized television cameras for monitoring visible effluents. Three young employees were put on bicycles to look for effluents on the ground, while a monitoring car checked for incidents just outside the Bayer plant. Effluents were also measured at the canals and the chimneys. 68 As at Henkel, the pace of organizational change and policy implementation can only be considered modest.
Henkel and Bayer invested in waste cleaning facilities, but again at a leisurely pace. In 1957, Henkel completed its first central water purification system to process wastewater before releasing it into municipal sewage systems at the main Düsseldorf plant. 69 Bayer also invested in air and water purification facilities. 71 It was managers at the front line of environmental issues at the local level who most understood the need for change. In 1960, the AWALU unit at Bayer reported to a top manager that complaints about polluted air and related damages in neighbouring residential areas had increased alarmingly, and argued that it would no longer suffice to argue that environmental pollution was unavoidable. 72 Letters from local residents complaining about noise, smell, or smoke were received by Bayer and Henkel practically on a daily basis. At an internal meeting of Henkel's senior managers in 1960, the problem was discussed in detail because ″it burdens (…) our relationship to our neighbours.″ 73 It became standard procedure at both companies to respond to letters from local residents, sometimes with personal invitations to visit factories.
However managers often struggled to make the case within their own organizations. The head of AWALU complained that the anti-pollution measures were not implemented effectively in factories due to resistance in the workplace. 74 Henkel also felt a need to educate staff about environmental issues, employing the house journal to communicate information about pollution problems. The company also regularly diffused water pollution laws to factory managers. 75 There was significant labour turnover at both firms, which made the challenge of educating staff on environmental issues a continuing one. 76 Bayer and Henkel relied on industry and professional organizations as the first defence against critical press coverage. In the mid-1950s, the VDI, which was responsible for the setting of technical guidelines for air pollution control, set up a working group ″on publication issues″ with the aim of ″countering the public's mistrust (…) through objective information, creating a sphere of trust between emitters and those affected.″ 77 The German Chemical Industry Association, an industry organization which represented firms in contacts with politicians, public authorities, other industries, and the media, pursued a similar strategy of seeking to deflect criticism by showcasing the industry's efforts to deal with effluent problems. 78 It also continued to assert that pollution problems were a necessary price to pay given the industry's regional and national importance. 79 The same argument continued to be used by the firms in their public statements, with the added refinement that further state regulation would handicap them in global markets.
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The two firms, and the German Chemical Industry Association, leveraged their long history of consultation and cooperation with local and regional officials as well as the federal government to seek to influence the content of regulation. 81 With regard to air pollution, Bayer explained to the local authorities in 1966 that nothing could be achieved without the cooperation and the goodwill of the industry. 82 Regulations usually evolved slowly in cooperation with the industry. The VDI's guidelines for air pollution standards, for example, were initially merely nonbinding suggestions. Managers at Henkel and Bayer noted internally that the Federal government waited for such guidelines before setting legal standards for the industry. 83 The interaction of firms, industry and professional associations, and policy-makers might appear to fit the varieties of capitalism description of post-war West Germany capitalism. 84 In fact, there were strong commonalities between what happened in Germany and the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. The American chemical industry, like the German, asserted that it was essential for economic growth, and that pollution was the price to be paid. This would support the sociological research noted earlier that the more powerful an organization, the more it could resist external pressures. Both American and German firms responded to threat of regulations by arguing for more detailed studies of the problem, owing to scientific uncertainties. Like the Germans, the American firms suggested that pollution incidents and complaints were a matter for local responses, tailored to specific settings, and considered primarily as nuisances rather than as environmental or health hazards. US chemical companies relied just as much as their German counterparts on industry associations and corporatist-style negotiations with the national, regional and local government authorities who held discretion over administrative responses to public complaints about pollution. 85 Uekötter has argued that the key difference between the US and Germany before 1970 was not that industry tried to lobby to shape regulation, but that Americans were more effective at it. This was the case here, when, for example, the efforts by German manufacturers to influence the VDI Clean Air Commission met with little success.
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The near-consensus in the literature on the American industry is that this era saw unsatisfactory outcomes, including ineffective policies and outright deceit by the chemical industry itself. Smith's already-cited case study of Du Pont provides a rare exception with its argument that the industry did reasonably well in pursuing solutions to complex policies with conflicting scientific evidence, and in the absence of much interest by either legislators or the public. 87 The evidence on the German chemical industry seems to broadly support Smith's argument that this kind of policy regime could achieve some positive outcomes, but in retrospect not nearly enough. A survey by the Vereinigung der Grosskesselbesitzer 89 Bayer's management reported the Leverkusen plant's emissions of nitrogen oxides and organic substances were "lower than the concentrations from the traffic on the nearby Autobahn." 90 The achievements appear concrete, but also bounded. The focus was on visible water pollution, dust and odour problems, while wider environmental issues received little attention.
Among the most important of such issues was finding alternatives to active agents which were polluting. Detergents again became central to debates as it emerged that the phosphate compounds used as builders in synthetic detergents, especially sodium tripolyphosphate (STPP), were contributing to eutrophication, a process by which water became over-fertilized leading to an excessive growth of algae and other plant life. As more oxygen was consumed by growing and decomposing water vegetation, insufficient oxygen remained for fish life. Lakes began to dry up and die. Although eutrophication occurred naturally, the process usually took tens of thousands of years. The far more accelerated eutrophication that was observed in the 1960s appeared to be related to phosphate detergents, although the scientific evidence was not clear-cut. 91 Henkel made an early research commitment to finding a workable substitute to the phosphorus issue. Konrad Henkel, who became chief executive in 1961 following the death of his elder brother, showed a new interest in engaging with environmental issues. The grandson of Henkel's founder, he had been trained as a chemist, and worked as a researcher before joining the family business in 1948. 92 He established an Ecological Research Department in 1964, which immediately started research on the effect of phosphates. The company also began to measure phosphate loads in the Rhine. 93 These steps were noticeably ahead of Henkel's major European competitor Unilever, which continued to take a reactive approach to the phosphate issue, not committing fully to developing a viable phosphate substitute, and only shifting to low-phosphate formulas when legislation demanded it. In the United States, however, P & G also initially responded as energetically as Henkel to mounting public criticism by undertaking research on substitutes. The firm developed a substitute, nitrolotriacetic acid (NTA), which it started using in 1966, and which became the preferred option of the Soap and Detergent Association until 1970, when it was discovered that NTA had health risks and was banned. 94 Thereafter the strategies of Henkel and P & G began to diverge. The German government adopted the principle of precaution (das Vorsorgeprinzip), rather than a specific standard of scientific proof, as the norm by which its environmental legislation would be guided. This was a radical move which few other governments followed. In Britain, for example, legislation tended to follow only on the basis of scientific evidence for environmental harm. This legislation reflected growing alarm about pollution. In 1970, one survey showed that 44 percent of the German public had stated that they would be willing to make personal sacrifices for environmental protection. By 1974, the number had increased to 70 percent. 107 Another survey showed that the chemical industry was considered a major culprit of environmental damage. The more educated the respondent, the more critical they were of industry. 108 Environmental concerns spanned the political spectrum. In 1975 it was Herbert
Building Green Identities
Gruhl, a CDU parliamentarian, who published a best-selling book entitled The Plundering of the Planet, which criticised unrestrained economic growth and the destruction of the ecosystem. 109 The criticism of the chemical industry in particular was as virulent in the United States as in West Germany, and in both countries industry leaders considered it unfair. ″A climate of hysteria has been created, in which an objective discussion is not possible anymore″, reflected Konrad Henkel in a speech in 1971. 110 In an internal discussion he called the issue a ″witch hunt″ against the chemical industry. 111 In the United States, P & G executives considered the media criticism against phosphates "emotional, political, and, at times, quite irrational." and at worse to deliberately cover up known and harmful environmental impacts. 114 Greer and
Bruno have argued that the strategies of denial, and lobbying, during the 1970s where the first stage of a process which had evolved by the late 1980s into a more elaborate "green washing," by US corporations, which involved the simultaneous co-opting of environmentalist rhetoric with strategies to weaken environmental standards. 
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The event raised expectations which were not immediately met. As a result, when
Henkel did not follow up with other public events, ten citizens from the local neighbourhood took action in January 1974 with an initiative named ″Protect the environment from Henkel.″ By March, it had attracted such political momentum that an official meeting between activists and representatives from every political party was held. A major press campaign against
Henkel was launched, and the activists demanded an environmental hearing by the Düsseldorf city government. The hearing was held in December. Henkel was obliged to defend its efforts to address pollution problems. 123 This prompted the company to engage in further efforts at local outreach. These included the launch of Henkel Umwelt Blick, a magazine for the citizens of Düsseldorf and in particular for the neighbors of the Henkel plant, in which the company presented its latest research on environmental protection. It had a circulation of 50,000. Berth's new department took responsibility for the coordination of activities aimed at developing new products to substitute for raw materials perceived environmentally damaging.
Henkel's most pressing concern was to find a substitute for phosphates. In 1973, Henkel filed for an initial patent for the synthetic zeolite builder Sasil, an environment-friendly alternative to phosphates. 130 In the same year, Helmut Sihler, a partner in Henkel and Chairman of the Central Board of Management, spoke publically about the trade-off raised for a firm by the issues of phosphates -the tension between providing consumers with a product using phosphates that they might prefer as a more effective detergent, and meeting wider societal needs by providing a zero-phosphate product which was better for the environment. 131 Sihler's observation was made within the context of a global view of the issues.
During regular visits to American and Japanese competitors, Henkel's managers explored how companies dealt with environmental questions, and if these countries might develop into markets for their new zeolite builder. In Japan, the visitors noted the ″cleanliness of the Japanese people,″ but also the complete neglect of air and water pollution control. Henkel managers observed the rising attention to environmental issues in the United States. phosphates from detergents. 134 Henkel argued against prioritizing the removal of phosphates through tertiary water treatment, and instead committed to more research until a zero phosphate detergent was found that prevented pollution. Henkel managers might have initially perceived a tension between consumer desires and helping the environment, by then it had become apparent that a green image was a way to add value in the saturated market for detergents. During the 1980s managers at Henkel's detergents competitor Unilever expressed annoyance that Henkel, as well as P & G, had achieved greater acclaim for being ″green″ than it had, even though their products and processes by then seemed not dissimilar in their environmental impact. 141 However it was noteworthy that Henkel pushed forward making only phosphate-free detergent at a time when both international competitors were, in some cases, reverting to the use of STPP.
Bayer's transition to a ″green giant″ paralleled that of Henkel, at least to some extent.
The firm was far more diversified than Henkel, and was not a producer of a product like detergents which was a visible symbol of environmental concerns, yet it also felt pressured to respond to the increasing criticism by the NRW state government, the citizens of Leverkusen, and others. The staff of the AWALU unit was increased from 100 to 207 between 1969 and 1971, and reached 480 in 1974. 142 AWALU stipulated in that year in an internal document that new products had to be designed as to meet the requirements of environmental protection. He opined to journalists his view that his firm "could not win" in environmental matters, because Bayer's enemies "would still throw dead fish from the river Elbe in front of our doors." 145 However, Grünewald also made it clear, externally and internally, that correct environmental policies were a corporate responsibility, and that damage control was not sufficient. "Regarding environmental damage," he told Der Spiegel in 1977, "we do not just want to repair it, we want to avoid it from the outset." In the same interview, Grünewald argued that environmental investments were an innovation opportunity for the firm. "When you introduce research for environmental protection," he noted, "you also create more value." 146 This was an early articulation of the now widespread phenomenon which Dauvergne and Lister have described as "eco-business" -the use of sustainability strategies by large firms to make efficiency gains and enhance brand value. 147 In 1975 the AWALU was renamed Environmental Protection/AWALU, and the number of employees increased further reaching 675 in 1980. 148 As Table 2 shows, the company's investments environmental protection rose through the 1970s, although it fell back in the wake of the second oil crisis. in Leverkusen in 1979. This facility comprised four hundred feet high towers, and was the first of its kind allowing biological waste water treatment in a small area with little noise and odour, and using only one-quarter of the energy which previous systems had employed. The facility treated waste from both the Bayer factory and the city. The technology was employed at the same time in Bayer's factory at Thane in Maharashhtra in India, and later adopted in other industries, including brewing. 153 Overall, in 1981, Bayer spent over two-thirds of its total investment in environmental protection on water cleaning facilities. 154 Company data
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showed that between 1977 and 1987 the amount of heavy metal elements in Bayer's wastewater fell by between 85 and 99 per cent, while pollutant emissions in the atmosphere declined by 80 per cent. 155 Across the range of the firm's businesses, there was a pattern of incremental investments. In 1963 Bayer had implemented a so-called double-contact process for a more efficient and environmentally conscious production of sulphuric acid used for mineral processing, fertilizer manufacturing, oil refining, wastewater processing, and chemical synthesis. The firm then invested in improving the process year after year, with momentum increasing over time. There were significant investments in improving this process over the following two decades. 156 There was similar incremental investments in improving the environment performance of the Roskydal product line of unsaturated polyester resins, which especially after 1980 made the product odourless and ever-more environmentally friendly.
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While Bayer was making improvements in reducing its negative environmental impact, there was also a new interest in building the firm's green credentials in the corporate image. ″Adequate marketing is almost as important as an environmentally neutral production″, argued the head of AWALU in 1972. 158 Bayer introduced a new slogan ″Bayer researches for environmental protection″ and a new logo, a green leaf, during that year.
Television advertisements informed the public about Bayer's environmental protection using the new slogan and logo. 159 In an internal document in 1972, Bayer managers argued that it was necessary to engage in more active marketing efforts to counter the ″industry-hostility″ that made conflicts with the neighbours more severe than they had been in the past. 160 AWALU selected a scientist for the environmental public relations who was the contact person for representatives of the media. The latter, members of the AWALU unit argued in 1972, were increasingly scientists themselves, for whose inquiries Bayer needed an equally well-educated spokesperson. 161 The concern to bolster the firm's positive environmental image extended below the senior management. In 1973 a representative of the workers council, Heinz Jacobi, suggested to the management board that Bayer should make a bigger effort showcasing its activities in environmental protection by organizing an exhibition, and in particular engaging with school children. The exhibition indeed took place in June 1974, and included the head of AWALU. 162 In 1974, following Grünewald's appointment as Chair, a sub-unit within AWALU was created which was dedicated to public relations. It organized an annual press conference concerning environmental protection with members of the management board as speakers, three to four smaller press conferences at the local level, as well as information and images for the press whenever necessary. The unit was meant to remain in constant contact with journalists ″to influence or even stop negative press regarding Bayer in critical situations", as
Dr. Meyer, the head of the sub-unit pointed out in an internal briefing. 163 Bayer was already engaged in community outreach. It created a competition for school pupils and university students to engage them in questions of environmental protection. It 166 Bayer also received more positive press coverage over time. In a 1978 article, the national Zeit called Bayer ″a green giant,″ noting its transformation after years of bad publicity. 167 Bayer invested heavily in communicating with the media. In 1980, it offered a seminar for journalists of regional and national newspapers with the title ″Research, Production − Safe and Environmentally Sound.″ 168 While Henkel's senior management, by the 1970s, was articulating strong views on environmental issues, and was prepared to move beyond regulatory compliance, as in the case of phosphates, Bayer more clearly fits the Dauvergne and Lister eco-business model.
Grünewald clearly understood that sustainability could be a source of value and credibility for the firm. Bayer was not engaged in green washing -there were real environmental gains in reducing the harmful effects of pollution and waste -and it was engaged like its US counterparts in trying to fight environmental regulation. However the strategy was fundamentally aimed at the "sustainability of big business, not sustainability of people and the planet."
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Conclusions
This working paper has traced the evolution of the corporate environmental strategies of The chemical industry's initial response in both cases was to argue that their enterprises were necessary to economic progress, that pollution was the price to be paid, and that more research was necessary. In both countries firms relied on industry associations and corporatist-style negotiations with local, regional and national authorities. Especially in the specific issue of detergent phosphates in water eutrophication, state and municipal governments in both countries were the first to move away from this pattern toward more adversarial and stricter regulatory threats. 1983. There were significant environmental activist movements in the United States also, but they were not powerful enough to win many public offices. During the early 1980s, as the Green Party entered the Bundestag, the Reagan administration was trying to emasculate the EPA.
However, this was at least as much of a regional story than a national one. The significant regulatory, political and other differences in many countries, perhaps especially Leverkusen, was equally vulnerable to being accused of creating "car-pox" and killing fish.
Initially this "domain-specific visibility" did not result in a marked divergence from strategies seen elsewhere, but its effect appears to have been both real and cumulative. By the 1970s, and after the Federal government had also become engaged in environmental issues, a new generation of corporate leaders such as Konrad Henkel, Herbert Grünewald and Friedrich
Bohmert had concluded that more reactive strategies were needed to fulfil societal expectations. They were savvy enough to understand that investing in environmental sustainability could provide an opportunity to create value for the firm, and that selfidentifying as eco-pioneers had commercial as well as reputational benefits, provided that the image reflected genuine policies and processes.
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